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JURISDICTION! NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from a District Court review of a final
order of the Department of Social Services, a State Agency.
It was originally filed in the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah, which later transferred the case to the Utah Court of
Appeals.
This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2 ) (a) (Supp. 1986).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
When a decree of divorce awarding custody of the children
to the mother is silent with regard to her child support obligation,
and she later relinquishes custody of the children to the father
without obtaining a modification of the decree to that effect,
and the father receives public assistance for the children,
is there a "court order" for purposes of determining whether
the Department of Social Services may use administrative proceedings
to assess the mother with a support obligation?
STATUTE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
This case turns on the interpretation of the first six
words of Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-5(l) (1953), as amended, which
reads as follows in pertinent part:
In the absence of a court order, the director
may issue a notice of support debt accrued or
accruing based upon the furnishing of support
by the department for the benefit of any
dependent child. . . . (Emphasis added)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State agrees with appellant's Statement of the Case,
but adds the following relevant point:
1.

Judge Timothy R. Hanson signed an Order on August

29, 1986, affirming the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law of the Administrative Law Judge, and affirming the Order
of the Department of Social Services. (R. 87-88).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State agrees with appellant's Statement of Facts, except
as noted below:
1.

Appellant states that "The Decree does not obligate

the Petitioner to pay any child support to Mr. Hutchinson."
(Appellant's Brief, P. 2). This is a true statement; however,
it may imply that the Decree affirmatively provided that appellant
(the "mother") had no child support obligation. Such an implication
would be incorrect.

It is more accurate to state that the Decree

was silent on the subject of the mother's child support obligation.

(R. 34-35).
2.

In addition to finding the mother legally obligated

under the Public Support of Children Act to reimburse the Department
for child support, the Administrative Law Judge found that she
was also so obligated under common law principles.

(R. 39-41).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Public Support of Children Act (Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-l
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to 24 (1953) , as amended) provides an administrative procedure
for assessing and collecting child support obligations.

When

applicable, it provides a relatively expeditious alternative
to judicial proceedings, and it has a built-in judicial review
procedure should an aggrieved party request it.
When there is an existing court order, the Act authorizes
the Department of Social Services to enforce that order by collecting
the child support obligation established by the order.
On the other hand, in the absence of a court order, the
Department is authorized to actually establish a child support
obligation (in accordance with certain specific statutory guidelines), and to enforce that obligation.

The determination of

the Department is subject to judicial review.
The authority of the Department to establish a support
obligation hinges on whether or not there is a "court order."
The State respectfully submits that under the facts of this
case, there was no court order as contemplated by Utah Code
Ann. S73-45b-5(l) (1953), as amended.
In this case, the Decree of Divorce said nothing about
the mother's child support obligation, and understandably so,
because she had custody of both of the children.

There was

no need for the Decree to deal with the issue of her child support
obligation, so it was totally silent on that point and made
no order one way or the other on that subject.
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For that reason, when the custody of the children was informally
switched to the father of the children, and he began receiving
public assistance, it was perfectly appropriate for the Department
to proceed administratively to "fill in the gap" left in the
Decree and to establish the mother's support obligation.
Appellant's brief, assuming almost without argument that
there was a "court order" in this case, focuses on other points
that are secondary and unnecessary for a determination of this
case.

Once this Court makes its decision regarding whether

or not there was a "court order" in this case, appellant's arguments
will become moot.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE DECISIVE ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS
A "COURT ORDER" AS CONTEMPLATED BY UTAH CODE ANN. §78-45b-5(l)
(1953) AS AMENDED. THE DETERMINATION OF THAT ISSUE WILL BE
DISPOSITIVE OF THE APPEAL.
This appeal turns on the interpretation of Utah Code Ann.
§78-45b~5(l) (1953), as amended, which provides that "in the
absence of a court order," the Department of Social Services
may use its administrative procedures to establish and enforce
the subject parent's child support obligation. If this court
determines that there was a court order in this case, then the
State clearly acted incorrectly and the Order of the Department
of Social Services must be set aside.
If, however, this Court sustains the reasoning of the Admini-
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strative Law Judge and of the District Court, and finds that
there was no court order as contemplated by Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-5
(1953), as amended, then the action of the Department of Social
Services should be upheld.
Appellant gives short shrift to the question of whether
or not there was a "court order."
out as an issue in the case.

She does not even set it

Instead, her argument begs the

question by making the unsupported assumption that "The Petitioner's
duty of child support has been fixed, an order exists, and the
issue is res judicata." (Appellant's Brief, P. 5 ) .

Using that

assumed premise as a starting point, she then makes three main
conclusions, which may be summarized as follows:
(1)

Where there is a court order fixing a support obligation,

that order is res judicata

(subject, of course, to appropriate

judicial modification);
(2)

A court-ordered support obligation cannot be modified

in administrative proceedings; and
(3)

A support

order

cannot

be modified

retroactively.

The State acknowledges that these three main points, as described
above, are accurate statements of existing Utah law.

It is

inappropriate to consider those three points, however, until
this Court determines the validity of appellant's initial premise
that there was a "court order."
premise is sustained

If her assumption on that

by this court, then on the basis of her
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three conclusions described above, she must prevail on the appeal
and the administrative action of the Department of Social Services
must be set aside.
Iff however, her premise fails, then her three conclusions
do not apply, because the premise on which they are based (a
"court order") does not exist.

Her entire appeal then fails

because the condition required by statute for the Department's
administrative action (the "absence of a court order") was satisfied
and the Department's action should be sustained.
Since it is the premise of appellant's argument, then,
that is decisive of the appeal, this brief deals primarily with
that premise.
POINT, TWO
WHEN A DECREE OF DIVORCE IS SILENT WITH REGARD TO THE CHILD
SUPPORT OBLIGATION OF A CUSTODIAL PARENT, THERE IS NO "COURT
ORDER" AS CONTEMPLATED BY UTAH CODE ANN. S78-45b-5(l) (1953),
AS AMENDED AND THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES MAY ESTABLISH
THAT PARENT'S SUPPORT OBLIGATION USING ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES.
There is sound reasoning for adopting the proposition that
in a case like this one, there really is no "court order" as
contemplated by Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-5(l) (1953), as amended,
and the use of administrative procedures to establish the support
obligation is proper.
The Public Support of Children Act begins by setting forth
some specific "legislative intent" language.

It states that:

It is declared to be the public policy of
this state that this chapter be liberally
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construed and administered to the end that
children shall be maintained from the
resources of responsible parents, thereby
relieving or avoiding, at least in part,
the burden often borne by the general
citizenry through welfare programs.
Utah Code Ann. $78-45b-l.l (1953), as amended.

In the following

section, the term "Court order" is defined as:
. . . any judgment or order of any district
court of this state . . . ordering payment of
a set or determinable amount of support money.
Utah Code Ann. $78-45b-2(3) (Supp.1986).

It is in the "absence"

of such an order that the Department of Social Services is authorized
to administratively establish a parent's support obligation.
Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-5(l) (1953), as amended.
Appellant asserts that the above-quoted statutes mean that
if there is any order dealing with the support obligation of
any party, then the Department is barred from administratively
establishing the support obligation of a parent, even if the
order doesn't say anything about tjfrat. parent' s support obligation.
(Since most divorce decrees do not make any affirmative statements
regarding the support obligations, or lack thereof, of custodial
parents, appellant's analysis would mean that Utah Code Ann.
$78-45b-5 (1953), as amended, would probably never apply in
any divorce case.) She claims that gilence in the decree regarding
the custodial parent's support obligation should be construed
as an affirmative determination that the custodial parent does
not have any child support obligation.
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Although the State acknowledges that appellants broad
reading of the definition of "court order" is plausible, it
submits that a more narrow reading is not only equally plausible,
but better serves the stated legislative intent and accomplishes
the public policies involved.
The State suggests that the better interpretation of the
above-quoted statutes is as follows:

In cases where the issue

of the child support obligation of the subject parent has clearly
come before the court, and some inference of the court's determination regarding that support obligation may be made from the
courtfs order, then,there is a court order covering the subject
parent's child support obligation and the Department has no
authority to take any action other than enforcement of that
order.

For example, if the court has specifically defined the

support obligation of the subject parent, or has specifically
reserved that parent's child support obligation for future judicial
determination, or has given custody of a child to one parent
and not assigned a child support obligation to the other parent
regarding that child, then there can be no doubt but that the
court was faced with the issue of the child support obligation
of the non-custodial parent and dealt with it in its order.
In other cases, such as the case at hand, where the Decree
is totally silent and the court has not really dealt with the
subject parent's support obligation, there should be no objection
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to establishing that obligation through administrative procedures.
In such a case, the Department of Social Services is not encroaching
on the province of the court, but is rather assisting the court
by filling in a gap which the court had not previously addressed.
The Administrative Law Judge clearly had this understanding
of the law when he stated in his Conclusions of Law that:
Without doubtf the defendant [the mother]
has both a common law and statutory obligation
to support her children which, for the purposes
of this proceeding, is neither,reduced nor
eliminated by whatever Jflfly be implied from
the language of the parties1 Divorce Decree.
(Emphasis added)
(R. 41).

The Administrative Law Judge was simply trying to

make a determination, in accordance with his statutory authority,
regarding something that had not even come before the trial
court at the time of the divorce.
Appellant's claim that judicial silence in the Decree of
Divorce in this case is tantamount to an affirmative order fixing
her support obligation at zero dollars per month per child is
incorrect.

It is not uncommon in judicial rulings for the court

not to address certain issues, either because they were not
raised by the parties or because they were not necessary to
a determination of the case.

The silence of the court regarding

such issues certainly should not be interpreted as a ruling
on their merits; all it means is that it was unnecessary for
the court to say anything about them.
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Similarly, in the case at hand, the silence of the court
in the Decree of Divorce regarding the mother's support obligation
should more properly be viewed as inaction on the part of the
court regarding that issue.

At the time of the Decree no action

was necessary regarding the mother's support obligation, so
none was taken.

Now, because of the informal change of custody,

that absence of any specific order now needs to be filled, and
that is where Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-5 (1953), as amended, comes
into play, giving the Department the opportunity to expeditiously
establish the mother's obligation.
A careful review of Utah Code Ann. S78-45b-5(l) (1953),
as amended, and the legislative intent surrounding the enactment
of the Public Support of Children Act thus provides support
for interpreting that statute so as to provide maximum use of
the administrative procedures of the Department of Social Services
in assessing child support obligations.
In addition, as a matter of sound public policy, the use
of the administrative process allows child support obligations
to be established and enforced in a relatively speedy, inexpensive,
and efficient manner. Since child support needs are ever-changing,
it is hard for the courts to keep up with the load of such cases.
It is helpful to have the administrative process available as
an alternative procedure (as long, of course, as it is not used
in situations where it would infringe upon jurisdiction reserved

-11-

for the courts).

The Department of Social Services is staffed

by trained child support specialists and is governed by strict
policy guidelines to ensure fair and equitable treatment of
child support obligors.

And, above all, its determinations

are always subject to judicial review should any aggrieved party
request it.

Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-6.1(2) (Supp. 1986).

The State acknowledges the recent case of Karjen vs. .State
Department of Social Services, 716 P.2d 810 (Utah 1986), cited
by appellant.

That case, however, has a different factual and

procedural posture from the case at hand and, for that reason,
it is not controlling.
In Karren, the trial court had ordered that custody of
the three children be split between the mother and the father,
with the father having two of the children.

Under such facts,

the court at the time of the divorce was clearly presented with
the question of what obligation, if any, the mother should have
for the children not in her custody.

The court determined that

the father should pay the mother $30.00 per week for the support
of the child in her custody, and did not obligate her to pay
support for the two children in his custody.

Later, the court

modified its order and abated the father's duty to pay child
support to the mother.
the mother.

No support obligation was imposed on

Even though the orders may have been silent regarding

the mother's support obligation, the circumstances of the case
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placed the issue of her support obligation squarely before the
court.

Subsequent to the entry of the decree and the order

modifying the decree, the Department of Social Services entered
an administrative order establishing a support obligation on
the part of the mother.
Under those facts, the Supreme Court held that there was
a previous court order regarding the mother's support obligation,
leaving the Department without authority to take such administrative
action. The court held: "Thus, DSS [Department of Social Services]
may not redetermine plaintiff's support obligation through an
administrative proceeding."

Karren, at p. 813.

The present case is distinguishable from K^rrep.
custody arrangement was before the court.

No split

It was a simple "Mother

gets the kids, Father pays child support" situation. The mother's
support obligation was not even an issue.

It is an exagger-

ation to say that the court made any determination regarding
her support obligation — that issue simply was not dealt with,
and the basis for the holding in the Kajrep case does not exist
here.
It is appropriate for the State to discuss the case of
St.ett.ler v, Stettle.J, 713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985), which was not
cited by appellant, but was referred in the Karren case. Stettler
is also factually and procedurally distinguishable from the
present case.
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In Stettler, the Supreme Court was faced with a case involving
private parties only.
the present case.

The State was not a party, as it is in

At issue was the interpretation of Utah Code

Ann. §78-45-7(3) (Supp. 1984), which establishes the method
to be applied by cour.t.s in assessing child support arrearages
"when no prior court order exists."

That statute does not apply

in the present case, which involves agency action, not court
action.
In Stettler, the father was initially awarded custody of
all three children, and the mother was required to pay him child
support.

Later, pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the

court ordered a change of custody, awarding the mother custody
of one of the children, but not requiring the father to pay
any support to the mother.
A few months later the mother petitioned the court for
a further modification, awarding her ongoing child support plus
arrearages .from the time jghe_obtained, custody of .the one .child.
The Supreme Court held that the mother was barred from collecting
arrearages because there was a prior court order dealing with
the support obligation for that child.

The Supreme Court appears

to have been strongly influenced by the fact that the mother
had entered into an express stipulation and modified the divorce
decree to provide for a change of custody, and had omitted any
change in the child support provisions.

The Court stated that:

-14-

This Court will not now remake the parties1
agreement and require respondent [the father]
to contribute to Robyn's support for the
contested period, when the parties themselves,
in their stipulation, did not see fit to
include it.
Stettler, at p. 703.
In the present case, not only is the court faced with the
interpretation of a different statute than that involved in
Stettler, but a third party (the State of Utah) is involved
which was not privy to the earlier divorce proceedings between
the father and mother. Although it may have been fair and equitable
for the Supreme Court to bind Mrs. Stettler to the modification
order which .she had been a party, to and had even stipulated
to, and to find that there was a sufficient court order to bar
her from receiving arrearages under Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(3),
(Supp. 1984), the interpretation of that statute in the Stettler
case does not control the interpretation of Utah Code Annotated
§78-45b-5(l) (1953), as amended, in this case. The latter statute
clearly gives the state rights to reimbursement of child support
which are independent of any rights belonging to the parent
receiving the public support.

It provides that the state may

serve a notice of support debt which shall include:
. . . a statement of the support debt
accrued or accruing, computable on the
basis of the amount .of, assistance paid
or to be paid . . . a demand for immediate
payment of the support debt or in the
alternative for a written answer . . .setting
forth any claimed defenses . . . and
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a statement that if neither answer nor full
payment are received within twenty days from
the date of service the department may assess and
determine that support debt. . . .
(Emphasis added)
Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-5 (1953), as amended.

The focus of

the above-quoted statute is on obtaining reimbursement of public
assistance paid by the State when there is no "court order,"
and the State's rights in this case are not dependent on those
of appellant's ex-husband.

The State is a real party in interest

acting in its own behalf. Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-3(2) (Supp. 1986).
The State submits that until there was a court order clearly
dealing with the jnothegVs support .QbjLigatjlQji in one way or another,
she had a general duty to support her children.

Utah Code Ann.

§78-45-4 (1953), as amended, provides that "Every woman shall
support her child. . . . "

The case of In. re „C, J.U.,

660 P.2d

237 (Utah 1983) holds that parents are "duty bound" to support
their children and that such duty of support is general in nature
unless and until it becomes circumscribed by a more specific
duty imposed by the court.

Since there was no such court order

in this case, the Department of Social Services was authorized
to administratively define that support obligation and to require
appellant to reimburse the taxpayers of Utah, at least in part,
for the public support given to her children, and to thereby
accomplish the intent of the legislature in adopting the Public
Support of Children Act.
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POINT THREE
THE MATTER OF APPELLANT'S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION IS NOT RES
JUDICATA.
For the reasons stated above, the State submits that prior
to the administrative action taken in this case, there was no
court order in existence regarding appellant's support obligation.
The principle of res judicata is therefore inapplicable, and
the Department of Social Services acted properly in taking administrative action to assess appellant's child support obligation.
The arguments set out in Point I of appellant's brief are all
premised on the assumption that there was a court order regarding
her support obligation, so no further response to them is required
in light of the State's position on this point.
POINT,FOUR
MODIFICATION OF A COURT-ORDERED SUPPORT OBLIGATION MAY NOT BE
MADE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS.
The State agrees with appellant on this point.

The State

disagrees with appellant's contention, however, that there is
a court-ordered support obligation in this case.
POINT FIVE
MODIFICATION OF AN EXISTING SUPPORT OBLIGATION MAY NOT BE IMPOSED
RETROACTIVELY, BUT ONLY PROSPECTIVELY.
The State agrees with appellant on this point.

The State

disagrees with appellant's contention, however, that there is
a court-ordered support obligation in this case.
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CQNC^USION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State asks the Court
to affirm the Order of the District Court. If this court determines
that the District Court's Order should be reversed, then the
administrative action taken herein by the Department of Social
Services should be set aside and the Department should be allowed
to proceed in the courts for any relief it seeks, using any
available legal theory.
DATED this

(l

day of March, 1987.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

BLAINERTFERGUSOS
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE,OF SERVICE
I certify that I hand-delivered four copies of this Brief
to Utah Legal Services, Inc., c/o Louisa L. Baker, Attorney
for Petitioner/Appellant, at 124 South 400 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111, this

l9

day of March, 1987.
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT
UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-1 to 13
(1953), as amended
MARSHA LEE HUTCHINSON VS. JOHN COLLINS
HUTCHINSON. Decree of Divorce, Third
District Court, State of Utah,
June 15, 1972

B

ORDER
Third District Court, State of Utah
August 29, 1986
(Respondent a l s o r e l i e s on the documents contained
in the Addendum t o a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f . )
(Please Note: The Decree of Divorce (Exhibit "B") is
also contained in the Addendum to appellant's brief.
However, it is included here because appellant's copy
inadvertently cuts off the bottom line on the first
page.)

C

Chapter 45. Uniform Civil Liability for
Support Act
7MS-1. Short title.
7MS-2 Definitions.
7MS-3. Doty of mm.
71-45-4. Duly of womii.
7 M 5 4 . 1 Duty of stepparent to tapport stepchild Effect of termination of marriage or commoi law
relationship.
7 M 5 4 . 2 . Natural or adoptive parent sat primary
obligation of tapport • Right of stepparent to recover
tapport.
7W5-4.3. Ward of ttatc - Primary obligation to
tapport.
7S-45-S Duty of obligor regardleas of presence or
residence of obligee.
7 M 5 4 . District coart Jurisdiction.
71-45-7. Determination of amoaat of tapport Astestmeaf formula for temporary tapport.
7M5-7.I. Medical aad dental etpeatet of dependent
chlldrea • Assigning rrspootiblliiy for payment •
Insurance coverage.
7 I 4 M , Continuing Jurisdiction.
7l«4J«t. Enforcement of right of tapport.
7 I 4 M . I , Repealed.
7*>45-*.2. County attorney to assist obligee.
7S-45-I0 Appeals.
71-45-11. Husband and wife privileged communication
inapplicable • Competency of spouses.
7M5-12. Rights are In addition to those presently
existing.
71-45-13. Interpretation and construction.

r«C ANNOTATION

consult the UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

341

G
^
M
£*
t-g
£
*S

78-45-1.

Judicial Code

78-45-1. Short tide.
This act may be cited as the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act.
t«S7
71-45-2. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) •State" includes any state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia
and the Commonwealth of Pueno Rico.
(2) 'Obligor' means any person owing a duty of
support.
(3) 'Obligee* means any person to whom a duty
of support is owed.
(4) "Child' means a son or daughter under the
age of 18 years and a son or daughter of whatever
age who is incapacitated from earning a living and
without sufficient means.
(5) 'Parent" includes a natural parent, an adoptive parent, or a stepparent.
(6) 'Stepparent' means a person ceremonially
married to a child's natural or adoptive custodial
parent who is not the child's natural or adoptive
parent or one living with the natural or adoptive
parents as a common law spouse, whose common
law marriage was entered into in a state which rec- ]
ognizes the validity of common law marriages.
(7) 'Stepchild' means any child with a stepparent.
(8) 'Earnings' means compensation paid or
payable for personal services, whether denominated
as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise,
and specifically include periodic payment pursuant
to pension or retirement programs, or insurance
policies of any type. Earnings shall specifically
include all gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined, including profit gained
through sale or conversion of capital assets.
itu
78-45-3. Duty of nan.
Every man shall support his child; and he shall
support his wife when she is in need.
itn
78-45-4. Duly of woman.
Every woman shall support her child; and she
shall support her husband when he is in need.
itsi
78*45-4.1 Duty of stepparent to support stepchild
* Effect of termination of marriage or common
law relationship.

A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same
extent that a natural or adoptive parent is required
to support a child. Provided, however, that upon
the termination of the marriage or common law
relationship between the stepparent and the child's
natural or adoptive parent the support obligation
shall terminate.
two
78-45-4.2. Natural or adoptive parent has
primary obligation of support - Right of
stepparent to recover support.
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the
natural parent ot adoptive parent of the primary
obligation of support; furthermore, a stepparent has
the same right to recover support for a stepchild
from the natural or adoptive parent as any other
oblige*.
it"
78-45-4.3. Ward of s u i t • Primary obligation lo
•rpport.
Notwithstanding section 78-45*2, a natural or
an adoptive parent or stepparent whose minor child
has become a ward of the state is not relieved of the
primary obligation to support that child until he
reaches the age of majority.
isu
71-45-5. Doty of obligor regardless of presence or
resideoce of obligee.
An obligor present or resident in this state has the
duty of support as defined in this act regardless of
342

Nr ANNOTATIONS, please coati

UTAH CODE
I9S6-I9S7

the presence or residence of the obligee.
i*$7
78-45-6. District court jurisdiction.
The district court shall have jurisdiction of all
proceedings brought under this act.
tfS7
78-45*7. Determination of amount of support •
Assessment formula for temporary support.
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the
amount granted by prior court order unless there
has been a material change of circumstance on the
part of the obligor or obligee.
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has occurred, the court
in determining the amount of prospective support,
shall consider all relevant factors including but not
limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the
parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the
parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(f) the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the
support of others.
(3) When no prior court order exists, the cpuft
shall determine and assess all arrearages based upon,
but not limited to:
(a) the amount of public assistance received by
the obligee, if any;
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and
necessarily expended in support of spouse and children.
(4) In determining the amount of prospective
support on an ex parte or other motion for temporary support, the court shall use a uniform statewide
assessment formula, adjusted for regional differences, prior to rendering the support order. The
formula shall provide for all relevant factors which
can be readily identified and shall allow for reasonable deductions from the obligor's earnings for
taxes, work related expenses, and living expenses.
The assessment formula shall be established by the
Department of Social Services and periodically reviewed by the Judicial Council under Subsection 783-21(3).
rtM
78-45-7.1. Medical and dental expenses of
i dependent children - Assigning responsibility for
payment - Insurance coverage.
When no prior court order exists or the prior
court order makes no specific provision for the
payment of medical and denial expenses for dependent children, the court shall include in its order a
provision assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses for the dependent children. If coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the court may also
include a provision requiring the purchase and
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and
dental care insurance for those children.
tfu
78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction.
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or
vacate the order of support where justice requires.
itsi
78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support.
(I) The obligee may enforce his right of support
against the obligor and the state department of
social services may proceed pursuant to this act or
any other applicable statute, either on its own behalf
or on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the obligee's
right of support against the obligor. Whenever any
court action is commenced by the state department
the UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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of social services to enforce payment of the
obliftot's support obligation, \\ shall to the duty of
the attorney genera) or the county attorney, of the
county of residence of the obligee, to represent that
department.
(2) No obligee shall commence any action to
recover support due or owing that obligee whether
under this act or any other applicable statute
without first filing an affidavit with the court at the
time the action is commenced stating whether that
obligee has received public assistance from any
source if the obligee has received public assistance,
the obligee shall join the department of social services as a party plaintiff in the action. The department of social services shall be represented as provided in subsection (1) of this section.
IIM
7 M S 4 . 1 . Repealed.
lit*
7IU5-9.2. County attorney to assist obligee.
The county attorney's office shall provide assistance to an obligee desiring to proceed under this act
in the following manner:
(I) Provide forms, approved by the Judicial
council of Utah, for an order of wage assignment if
the obligee is not represented by legal counsel;
(J) The county attorney's office may charge a fee
not to exceed $23 for providing assistance to an
obligee under subsection (1).
1$) Worn* the obligee of the right to file unpecuniouily if the obligee is unable to bear the expenses
of the action and assist the obligee with such filing;
(4) Advise the obligee of the available methods
for service of process; and
(5) Assist the obligee in expeditiously scheduling a
hearing before the court.
twj
7M3-10. Appeals.
Appeals may be taken from orders and judgments
under this act as in other civil actions.
i*S7
7 M 5 - U . Husband and wife privileged
communication inapplicable - Competency of
spouses.
taws attaching a privilege against the disclosure
of communications between husband and wife are
inapplicable under this act. Spouses are competent
witnesses to testify to any relevant matter, including
marriage and parentage.
tm
7 M M 2 . Rights art In addition to those
presently existing.
The rights herein created are in addition to and
noi in substitution to any other rights.
its*?
71-45-13. Interpretation and construction.
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as
to cfiectuate its general purpose to make uniform
the lau of those stales which enact it.
its7
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIPD JUDICAL DISTRICT,
IN A N D FOR S A L T L A K E C O U N T Y , S T A T E O F U T A H

MARSHA LEE HUTCHINSON,
plaiuiff.

•
£ -£# ~9& f'Sf
:
: D E C R E E OF D I V O R C E
:
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A.H.
"'

JOHN COLLINS HUTCHINSON,
Civil No.
D-6455
defendant.
:
*****************************************************
This cause having come on regularly for hearing on the 9th day of June
1972 before the honorable Emmctt L. Brown with plaintiff being present and
represented by counsel, defendant not present nor represented by counsel, the
Court taking notice of more than 90 days elapsed since filing of plaintiffs
complaint and defendant's being duly served with p r o c e s s having failed to
respond to this action in the time allowed by law, defendant's default was duly
entered.

Plaintiff being ..worn and from her testimony adduced the Court being

fully advised in the p r e m i s e s having made and entered its Findings of F a c t s
and Conclusionsof Law; now on motion of Leland K. Wimmer, i t
ORDERED,
1.

ADJUDGED

nd

is

hereby

DECREED:

That plaintiff be and she is awarded divorce from defendant and each of

the parties is restored to the status of an unmarried person freed from their
bons of matrimony, provided however, . that this decree shall not become
final and absolute until the expiration of three months from date of signing by
judge and entry hereof, provided further, that this decree shall become final
and absolute upon said expiration of three months unless the appeal is pending
or the Court upon its own motion or application of any other person, whether
interested or nd
3,

otherwise orders.

Plaintiff be and hhe is awarded the sole CARE, CUSTODY and CONTROL

of Diana Michele Hutchinson, horn January 2. 1967, and John Collins Hutchinson,
born April 29, 1969, subject to rights of defendant to »'isit said children at
reasonable t i m e s ;md places in accordance with their ages and his facilities.
3.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant who is rdered to pay to

^ *

II
the sum of $1^0. 00 per month a s alimony for the plaintiff for a total of $220. 00
each month payable through the office of the Salt Lake County Clerk, Support
<> and Alimony division, at the rate of $110. 00 on the 20th day of June 1972,
t!
H $110. 00 on the 5th day of July, $110. 00 on the 20th dav of July 1972 and simi!'ir
amounts on the 5th and 20th of each month thereafter.
I

4.

Plaintiff be and she i s awarded a s her sole and separate property the

1961 Ford Falcon, all furniture, appliances, furnishings and effects which are
;»' in her personal p o s s e s s i o n and control.
i

I'
r

5.

Defendant be and he i s awarded a s his sole and separate property the

ji 1945 Dodge Pickup, his fishing and hunting equipment and his personal effects.
M

!,

6. Plaintiff be and she i s awarded against defendant an additional judgment

j in the sum of $250. 00 a s attorney fees for the e s e and benefit of her attorney
j herein together with judgment in the sum of $6. 60 for c o s t s of Court and
specifically reserving the judgment of $75.00 a s temporary attorneys fees for
the Order To Show Cause hearing.
7,

Plaintiff i s awarded against defendant funher judgment in the amount of

$300. 00 a s a r r e a r s of temporary child support and alimony in this matter.
8.

Defendant i s ordered to pay and discharge and hold h a r m l e s s the plaintiff

form all such obligations end indebtedness of the family incurred during the
marriage including by not limited to Granite Furnitire Company, Sugarhouse
Appliance Co. , J2ETNA loan Company and Lincoln Loan Company.
Dated

this

15th day

ATTEST

of J u n e
By t h e

A.D.

1972.
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i n of. ihe foregoing Decree
1 hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
|*U1AH
) g 8 ofDivorettodefendant, John Collins Hutchinson, 1243G&rne*te* S t r e e t , SaltLake
:NW OF SALT LAKE )
City, Utah 84116, this 15th day of June 1972.
T l « UNDERSIGNED, CLERK OF THE DISTRICT
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I R f F SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, CO HV^rDY
^HWT ^
TIM THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOREGOING IS
^ / V O
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WILKINSON

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

D A V I D L.
Attorney General
B L A I N E R. F E R G U S O N
Assistant Attorney General
3195 South M a i n S t r e e t
Salt L a k e C i t y , U t a h
841 15
Telephone:
483-63J3

AUG 2 9 1986
H. Dixon Hindiey. Clerk 3rd Dist. Court
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DISTRICT

COURT

IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE C 0 U N 1 Y , S T A T E OF UTAH
M A R S H A LEE S T A R K S , aka
MARSHA LEE BEACHLER,
ORDER
Petitioner/Defendant
vs.*
STATE OF U T A H , D E P A R T M E N T
OF S O C I A L S E R V I C E S ,
Respondent/Plaintiff
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